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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
) Docket No. 34765 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
) 
) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
DAVID F. CAPPS, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, In and 
For the County of Idaho 
HONORABLE JOHN H. BRADBURY 
District Judge Presiding 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,pro se 
DAVID F. CAPPS,prose 
Residing at 104 Jefferson Dr., Kamiah, Idaho 83536, 
For Appellants. 
JEFFREY M. WILSON, WILSON & McCOLL 
Residing at 420 W. Washington, P.O. Box 1544, Boise, Idaho 83701, 
For Respondent. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................. : ............................ 1 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL ............................................................................... 2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................. 2 
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 3 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
DELAWARE LAW APPLIED ................................................... .3 
I. IDAHO CODE SECTION 28-41-201(8) DOES NOT APPLY 
TO THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT .................................... 3 
2. APPL YING THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISION IS NOT 
AGAINST THE PUBLIC POLICY OF IDAHO ..................... 4 
3. THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS 
FOR THE AMENDMENT ................................................ 6 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THERE 
WAS AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE AS A MEETING OF THE 
MINDS CLEARLY EXISTED .................................................... 7 
C. APPELLANTS' THIRD ARGUMENT WAS NOT RAISED 
BELOW AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL .......... 7 
D. APPELLANTS' FOURTH ARGUMENT WAS NOT RAISED 
BELOW AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL .......... 8 
E. THE PARTIES AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE ARBITRATION 
WAS NOT UNCONSCIONABLE ................................................ 8 
F. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
AV ALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENT EXISTED, THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS WAIVED 
THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. ............................................. .11 
i 
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... .11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ....................................................................... 13 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: 
Barbee v. WMA Secs., Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 (Idaho 2006) ........................... 2 
Copeland v. MBNA Am., N.A., 820 F. Supp. 537 (D. Colo. 1993) ................................... 4 
Coleman v. Assurant, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 862 (D. Nev. 2007) ....................................... .4 
Empire Lumber Co. v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, Inc., 132 Idaho 295, 
971 P.2d 1119 (Idaho 1998) ................................................................................................ 2 
Envirotech Corp. v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 109 Idaho 762, 710 P.2d 672 
(Idaho Ct. App.) ................................................................................................................... 5 
FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Klinzing, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66421 (W.D. Wis. 2008) ...... 4 
Graham v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 565 A.2d 908 
(Del. 1989) ......................................................................................................................... !0 
Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 693 P.2d 1092 
(Idaho 1984) ........................................................................................................................ 5 
Highlands Dev. Corp. v. City of Boise, 188 P.3d 900 (Idaho 2008) ................................... 8 
John M. Floyd & Assoc. v. Star Fin. Bank, 489 F.3d 852 (ih Cir. 2007) ........................... 4 
Kelly v. MBNA American Bank, 2007 WL 4233671 (D. Del. 2007) ................................ .4 
Lovey v. Regence Blueshield ofidaho, 139 Idaho 37, 72 P.3d 877 (Idaho 2003) .............. 9 
Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (Idaho 2005) ................................ 2 
Nagle v. Herold, 30 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. New York 1939) ................................................. 3 
Progressive Int'! Corp. v. E.I. duPonte de Nemours & Co., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91 
(Del. 2002) ......................................................................................................................... 10 
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996) ............... 3 
iii 
Spark v .. MBNA Corp., 178 F.R.D. 431 (D. Del. 1998) ..................................................... 4 
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 167 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2007) ............... 3, 4 
Yellowpine Water User's Ass'n v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349, 670 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1983) ...... 4, 5 
Statutes: 
LA.R. 41 .............................................................................................................................. 2 
LA.R. 35(1>)(5) .................................................................................................................... 2 
LC.§ 12-L20(3) ........... .' .... ; .................................................................................................. 2 
LC.§ 12-121 ........................................................................................................................ 2 
LC.§ 28-43-203 ................................................................................................................... 6 
LC.§ 28-41-301 ............................................................................................................... 6, 7 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The National Arbitration Forum issued two separate awards against each Appellant. 
Subsequently, suit was initiated by Appellants and Respondent moved to confirm the awards. 
All claims were eventually consolidated into Case No. CV 36747. 
On August, I 0, 2006, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the applicability of the 
parties' arbitration clause. At said hearing, Respondent presented evidence that Delaware law 
applied to the agreement; that Appellants were given notice pursuant to Delaware law that if 
Appellants failed to reject the amendment by a certain date in writing, the arbitration provision 
would become effective; that said notices were mailed to Appellants; and that Respondents did 
not receive an opt-out letter as required. As a result, the trial court confirmed the awards 
pursuant to its September 14, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order. Notably, Appellants 
conceded that Delaware law applied to the parties' agreement through this time. After an 
exhaustive amount of briefing relating to Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration, the trial court 
upheld its confirmation through its November 9, 2007 Amended Memorandum Decision and 
Order. 
Only considering the arguments raised below, Appellants' appeal is based on upon the 
theories that Idaho law, not Delaware law, applies to the parties' agreement; that there was never 
a meeting of the minds regarding the arbitration provision; and that the arbitration agreement is 
unconscionable. Pursuant to the argument below, the trial court's confirmation of awards must 
stand. 
I 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL (REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES) 
If found to be the prevailing party, Respondent requests an award of attorney's fees on 
appeal pursuant to I.AR. 41, I.AR. 35(b)(5), LC.§ 12-120(3) and LC.§ 12-121. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing the district court's decision to vacate or modify an award, this Court is 
limited to determining whether any grounds for relief stated in the Idaho Uniform Arbitration 
Act exist. Barbee v. WMA Secs., Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 394, 146 P.3d 657, 660 (Idaho 2006). An 
arbitrator's rulings on questions of law and fact are binding, even where erroneous, unless one of 
the enumerated statutory grounds is present. Id. Under the UAA, a district court may vacate an 
arbitrator's award only where: (I) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue 
means; (2) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator; (3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
( 4) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing to the prejudice of a party; or ( 5) there was no 
arbitration agreement and the party did not participate in the hearing without objecting. Moore 
v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809,815, 118 P.3d 141, 147 (Idaho 2005). Ifa district court makes 
additional findings of fact the proper standard of review as to the findings is substantial and 
competent evidence. Id. 
An interpretation of a statute is a question of Jaw over which the Court exercises free 
review. Barbee, 143 Idaho at 394. 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial and its decision 
to admit such evidence will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. 
Empire Lumber Co. v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, 132 Idaho 295,304,971 P.2d 1119, 1128 
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(Idaho 1998). 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT DELAWARE 
LAW APPLIED. 
Appellants' first argues that the trial court erred in finding that the Delaware law applied 
in confirming the arbitration provisions relating to this action. Appellants' arguments is based 
upon the theory that the Delaware choice of law provision in the parties' agreement is against the 
public policy of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code Section 28-41-201(8) and because it is the public 
policy of Idaho not to allow unilateral amendments to contracts. The argument below will 
establish that the trial court did not err in finding that Delaware law applied. Further, in the 
event it is determined that Idaho law applies in this case, amendment was allowed pursuant to the 
Idaho Credit Code. 
1. IDAHO CODE SECTION 28-41-201(8) DOES NOT APPLY TO THE 
PARTIES' AGREEMENT. 
"Business activities of national banks are controlled by the National Bank Act." Watters 
v, Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S.Ct. 1559, 1564, 167 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2007). The "laws of the 
States in which national banks or their affiliates are located govern matters the NBA (National 
Bank Act) does not address." Id. at 1572 (emphasis added); Nagle v. Herold, 30 F. Supp. 905, 
906 (W.D. New York 1939) ("The Seneca National Bank of West Seneca is a national bank. 
Insofar as its contracts are concerned it is subject to the laws of the State of New York, in which 
it is located."); ;Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 737, 116 S. Ct. 1730, 
135 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1996) (finding Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. to be located in South Dakota 
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and applying South Dakota law). Pursuant to Watters, contracts made by national banks are 
governed by State law. Watters, at 1567. 
MBNA America Bank, N.A., was at all relevant times a national bank. See generally, 
John M. Floyd & Assocs. v. Star Fin. Bank, 489 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2007); FIA Card Servs., 
N.A. v. Klinzing. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66421, 3 (W.D. Wis. 2008); Kelly v. MBNA American 
Bank, 2007 WL 4233671 (D. Del. 2007); Spark v. MBNA Corp., 178 F.R.D. 431 (D. Del. 1998); 
Copeland v. MBNA Am., N.A., 820 F. Supp. 537 (D. Colo. 1993). Further, MBNA America 
Bank, N.A., is located in the State of Delaware. [Tr., August, 10, 2006, Exhibits 1 & 2]; FIA 
Card Servs., N.A. v. Klinzing. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66421, 3 (W.D. Wis. 2008); Coleman v. 
Assurant, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 862, 866 (D. Nev. 2007) (Delaware has a substantial relation 
with the transaction because that is where headquarters of MBNA is located). Accordingly, the 
trial court did not err in concluding that Delaware law applied. 
2. APPLYING THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISION IS NOT AGAINST 
THE PUBLIC POLICY OF IDAHO. 
Appellants first argue that there is a public policy in Idaho against the unilateral 
amendment of contracts. Yellowpine Water User's Ass'n v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349, 670 P.2d 54 
(1983) ("One party cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract and attempts to add terms 
without the consent of all parties are ineffectual."). However, the facts in Yellowpine are 
distinguishable from those in this case. In Yellowpine, the relationship between the parties 
rested in an implied contract. Id. at 352. At that time, the agreement did not allow for a fee for 
involuntary disconnection for nonpayment of a water bill, which was charged. Id. Because the 
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parties did not consent to the disconnection fee, said fee was not allowed. Id. 
In this case, there can be no doubt that Appellants consented to the amendment of the 
parties' agreement to include arbitration. While, silence or failure to reject an offer usually is not 
evidence of intent to accept the offer, an offer may be accepted by silence if the offeror has 
stated or given the offeree reason to understand that assent may be manifested by silence or 
inaction, and the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept the offer. Eimco Div. 
Envirotech Corp. v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 109 Idaho 762, 764, 710 P.2d 672 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1985). Unlike Yellowpine, there was evidence that Appellants were mailed notices regarding the 
amendment of the parties' agreement to include arbitration. [Tr., August, 10, 2006, Exhibits 1]. 
Pursuant to said notices, if Appellants failed to reject the amendment by a certain date in writing, 
the arbitration provision would become effective. Id. As found by the trial court, no opt-out 
letter was received by Respondent. [R. 107]. Therefore, there was in fact consent to the 
arbitration amendment. The amendment of the parties' agreement to include arbitration cannot 
be said to be against the public policy of Idaho as there was not a unilateral change the terms 
without the consent of the parties. 
Next, Appellants argue that there is a public policy in Idaho against the forming of 
contracts without a meeting of the minds. "It long has been settled that no enforceable contract 
exists unless it reflects a meeting of the minds and embodies a distinct understanding common to 
both parties." Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 893, 693 
P.2d 1092 (Idaho 1984). "The contract must be specific enough to show that the parties shared a 
mutual intent." Id. "In general, a contract also must create a mutuality of obligation." Id. 
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Here, there is no argument that Delaware law allows for an agreement to be amended 
without a meeting of the minds, and is therefore against the public policy of Idaho. The 
argument set forth by Appellants is that there was in fact no meeting of the minds. Nevertheless, 
the record fails to establish that there was a lack of mutuality of obligation, contract specificity or 
a distinct understanding shared by the parties. As articulated above, there was evidence that 
Appellants were mailed notices regarding the amendment of the parties' agreement to include 
arbitration. [TR., August, 10, 2006, Exhibits I]. The notices specifically stated that if 
Appellants failed to reject the amendment by a certain date in writing, the arbitration provision 
would become effective. Id. An opt-out letter was not received by Respondent. [R. I 07]. 
Therefore, there was in fact consent and a meeting of minds to the arbitration amendment. The 
amendment of the parties' agreement to include arbitration cannot be said to be against the 
public policy ofidaho. 
3. THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE SPECIFICALLY ALLOWS FOR THE 
AMENDMENT. 
In the event it is determined that Idaho law applies in this case, amendment was allowed 
pursuant to the Idaho Credit Code, which reads: 
28-43-203. CHANGE IN TERMS OF OPEN-END CONSUMER 
CREDIT ACCOUNTS. Whether or not a change is authorized by prior 
agreement, a creditor may change the terms of an open-end consumer 
credit account applying to any balance incurred before or after the 
effective date of the change. 
Idaho Code Section 28-43-203. Idaho Code Section 28-41-301 defines open-ended credit 
agreement as an arrangement which: 
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(a) A creditor may permit a debtor, from time to time, to purchase on 
credit from the creditor or pursuant to a credit card, or to obtain loans from 
the creditor or pursuant to a credit card; 
(b) The amounts financed and the finance and other appropriate charges 
are debited to an account; 
( c) The finance charge, if made, is computed on the account periodically; 
and 
( d) Either the debtor has the privilege of paying in full or in installments 
or the creditor periodically imposes charges computed on the account for 
delaying payment and permits the debtor to continue to purchase on credit. 
Idaho Code Section 28-41-301. 
The agreement between the parties matches the definition of an open-end credit 
agreement as set forth above. As a result, Respondent was allowed to amend its agreement with 
Appellants, which, as established above, was properly accomplished. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS 
AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE AS A MEETING OF THE MINDS CLEARLY 
EXISTED. 
The Appellants do not provide further argument regarding the issue of whether there was 
a meeting of the minds other than that which was provided in their first argument. As argued 
and established above, the record fails to establish that there was a lack of mutuality of 
obligation, contract specificity or a distinct understanding shared by the parties. The trial court 
did not err in finding that there was an agreement to arbitrate as a meeting of the minds clearly 
existed. 
C. APPELLANTS' THIRD ARGUMENT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL. 
"Issues not raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered or 
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reviewed." Highlands Dev. Corp. v. City of Boise, 188 P.3d 900, 909, (Idaho 2008). At all 
times before the trial court's September 14, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order, Appellants 
conceded and affirmatively stated that Delaware law applied. [R. 107]. Further, at no time 
between the trial court's September 14, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order and November 
9, 2007 Amended Memorandum Decision and Order did Appellants object to the application of 
Delaware law based upon Idaho Rules of Evidence 1002, 1003 and 1004. Accordingly, 
Appellants' third argument cannot be considered or reviewed. 
D. APPELLANTS' FOURTH ARGUMENT WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL. 
"Issues not raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered or 
reviewed." Highlands Dev. Corp. v. City of Boise, 188 P.3d 900,909, (Idaho 2008). Appellants 
argue that Respondent's Application for Confirmation of Arbitration Award was defective when 
filed pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 13. However, such argument was never raised below, and therefore, 
cannot be considered or reviewed. 
E. THE PARTIES AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE ARBITRATION WAS NOT 
UNCONSCIONABLE. 
The law regarding whether contracts are unconscionable is best outlined in Lovey v. 
Regence Blueshield of Idaho: 
When reviewing an unconscionability determination made by the trial 
court, we must accept the factual findings made by the trial court, as long 
as they are supported by substantial, competent evidence. Whether, under 
those facts, a contractual provision is unconscionable is a question of law 
over which this Court exercises free review. It is not sufficient, however, 
that the contractual provisions appear unwise or their enforcement may 
seem harsh. 
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For a contract or contractual provision to be voided as unconscionable, it 
must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural 
unconscionability relates to the bargaining process leading to the 
agreement while substantive unconscionability focuses upon the terms of 
the agreement itself. 
Procedural unconscionability may arise when the contract "was not the 
result of free bargaining between the parties." Indicators of procedural 
unconscionability generally fall into two areas: lack of voluntariness and 
lack of knowledge. Lack of voluntariness can be shown by factors such as 
the use of high-pressure tactics, coercion, oppression or threats short of 
duress, or by great imbalance on the parties' bargaining power with the 
stronger party's terms being nonnegotiable and the weaker party being 
prevented by market factors, timing, or other pressures from being able to 
contract with another party on more favorable terms or to refrain from 
contracting at all. Lack of knowledge can be shown by lack of 
understanding regarding the contract terms arising from the use of 
inconspicuous print, ambiguous wording, or complex legalistic language, 
the lack of opportunity to study the contract and inquire about its terms, 
Id.; or disparity in the sophistication, knowledge, or experience of the 
parties. 
Substantive unconscionability focuses solely upon the terms of the 
contract or provision at issue. The contract or provision is substantively 
unconscionable if it is a bargain that no person in his or her senses and not 
under delusion would make on the one hand and that no honest and fair 
person would accept on the other. Factors to consider include whether the 
contract or provision is one-sided or oppressive. When determining 
whether a contractual provision is unconscionable, the court must consider 
the purpose and effect of the terms at issue, the needs of both parties and 
the commercial setting in which the agreement was executed, and the 
reasonableness of the terms at the time of contracting. 
Lovey v. Regence Blueshield ofldaho, 139 Idaho 37, 42-43, 72 P.3d 877 (Idaho 2003). 
Delaware law applies the same principles. As stated in Progressive Int'! Corp. v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co.: 
For a contract clause to be unconscionable, its terms must be "so one-sided as to 
be oppressive." Put another way, "unconscionability has generally been 
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recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the 
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other 
party." Courts have been reluctant to apply the doctrine, recognizing among other 
things that the parties' "bargaining power will rarely be equal." 
Progressive Int'! Corp. v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, 37 (Del. 
2002)1• 
Notably, Appellants do not provide any legal authority to determine whether a contract is 
unconscionable. Further, it does not appear that Appellants are basing their argument on 
"substantive" unconscionability, but rather "procedural" unconscionability. However, lack of 
voluntariness and lack of knowledge have not been established. There is nothing in the record 
evidencing high-pressure tactics, coercion, oppression, duress, or a great imbalance in bargaining 
power. There is nothing in the record evidencing a lack of understanding regarding the contract 
terms arising from the use of inconspicuous print, ambiguous wording, or complex legalistic 
I In Graham v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 565 A.2d 908 (Del. 
1989), the Supreme Court of Delaware held that for a contract to be void due to an imbalance of 
bargaining power or "unconscionability," the terms of the contract must be so one-sided as to be 
oppressive or there must be such superior bargaining power in one party that it clearly takes 
advantage of the other. The Court went on to hold that mere disparity between bargaining power 
of parties to contract will not support a finding of unconscionability. Id., at 912. Therefore, it 
follows that, absent evidence of inequality in bargaining power and/or inherent unfairness, the 
Agreement is valid and enforceable under Delaware law. Appellants have offered no evidence 
of any inequity in bargaining power. Furthermore, the Delaware Supreme Court has expressly 
held "the fact that a contract is adhesive does not give rise to a presumption ofunenforceability." 
Id. at 912. The Court went on to note "the adhesion factor is an aid in contract interpretation." 
Id. The Court reasoned that "because [the defendants] have not argued that [the contract clause] 
is ambiguous, we have no occasion to apply this rule of construction." The Court further 
reasoned that "a party to a contract cannot silently accept its benefits and then object to its 
perceived disadvantages, nor can a party's failure to read a contract justify its avoidance." Id. at 
913. 
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language, the lack of opportunity to study the contract and inquire about its terms, or disparity in 
the sophistication, knowledge, or experience of the parties. Rather, the record shows that 
Appellants were mailed notices regarding the amendment of the parties' agreement to include 
arbitration. [TR., August, 10, 2006, Exhibits I]. The notices specifically stated that if 
Appellants failed to reject the amendment by a certain date in writing, the arbitration provision 
would become effective. Id. An opt-out letter was not received by Respondent. [R. I 07]. 
Nothing in the record suggest that the agreement in question was unconscionable. 
F. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT A 
VALID ARBIRTATION AGREEMENT EXISTED, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. 
Appellants' last argument is based on their argument that a valid arbitration agreement 
did not exist between the parties. For all the reasons articulated above, the trial court did not err 
in finding that such agreement existed and was valid. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 
finding that Appellants waived the right to a jury trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It is urged that the Judgment appealed from be confirmed. 
DA TED this ::j_ day of October, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / day of October, 2008, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'SBilIEF, by hand delivering two (2) copies or 
causing to be placed two (2) copies thereof in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
HONORABLE JOHN BRADBURY 
c/o Idaho County Clerk of the Court 
320W. Main 
Grangeville, Idaho 83530 
David Capps 
Miriam Carroll 
104 Jefferson Dr. 
Kamiah, Idaho 83536-9410 
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